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Blood-debts and Battlefields: Ulster Imperialism
and Masculine Authority on the Western Front
1916–1918 
JANE MCGAUGHEY
Abstract
Men’s bodies were one of the more notable sites of conflict in Northern Ireland
after the 1918 armistice. Long before the war was over, Ulstermen had become
part of a public legacy of blood-sacrifice and the epic mythology of warrior
manliness surrounding the 36th (Ulster) Division. The predominantly Protestant
north-east of Ireland revelled in heroic language and romantic sentiment about
their losses and the consequences of their sacrifice. For years after their most
famous battle at the Somme on the 1st of July 1916, Unionists maintained a
vibrant communal memory that pointedly excluded the achievements and sacri-
fices of the 16th (Irish) and 10th (Irish) Divisions, to the detriment of northern
Nationalist veterans. More importantly, the ramifications of northern society’s
understanding of soldiering masculinities directly led to some of the more infa-
mous physical events of The Troubles from 1920 to 1922. These episodes included
the violent shipyard expulsions in Belfast, the intimidation of shell-shocked 
ex-servicemen, membership in vigilante paramilitary societies, and government-
mandated floggings of Catholic veterans in a society that prized service in the
Great War as the greatest hallmark of modern Irish masculinity.  The language
of sacrifice within the public sphere, witnessed in public discourse and literally
imprinted upon the bodies of those deemed unworthy and unmanly, mytholo-
gized one group of men at the expense of another, making the legacy of the Great
War and the actions of and upon male bodies highly significant and influential
factors in Northern Ireland for the rest of the twentieth century.
Résumé
Au lendemain de l’armistice de 1918, en Irlande du Nord, le corps masculin
s’est révélé l’un des plus remarquables lieux de conflit imaginables. Bien avant
la fin de la guerre, les habitants de l’Ulster s’étaient trouvés investis de
l’héritage public du sacrifice du sang et de la mythologie épique de la virilité
guerrière entourant la 36e division (Ulster). Pendant des années après leur plus
célèbre bataille, celle de la Somme le 1er juillet 1916, les Irlandais du Nord-
Est, à prédominance protestante, se sont délectés d’un langage héroïque et
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d’un sentiment romantique pour évoquer les pertes et les conséquences de leurs
sacrifices, donnant lieu à un vif souvenir collectif construit à l’exclusion des
réalisations et des sacrifices des 16e et 10e Divisions (Irlande), au détriment
des anciens combattants nationalistes du Nord. Par-dessus tout, la conception
nord-irlandaise de la virilité militaire a directement conduit à certaines des
confrontations tristement célèbres des Troubles, de 1920 à 1922. Parmi ces
épisodes, il faut citer les expulsions violentes des chantiers navals à Belfast,
l’intimidation d’anciens combattants commotionnés, les actions de sociétés
paramilitaires d’autojustice et les flagellations d’anciens combattants
catholiques autorisées par le gouvernement dans une société valorisant le ser-
vice de la Grande Guerre comme sceau suprême de la virilité irlandaise
moderne. Le langage du sacrifice dans la sphère publique, attesté dans le dis-
cours public et littéralement gravé sur le corps des hommes jugés indignes ou
lâches, a eu pour effet de transformer en héros mythiques un groupe d’hommes
au détriment d’un autre, faisant de l’héritage de la Grande Guerre et des gestes
posés par les hommes (et sur leur corps) des réalités très significatives et d’une
grande influence en Irlande du Nord pendant tout le reste du XXe siècle.
On 1 July 1916, the opening day of the Battle of the Somme, 2nd Lieutenant John Leslie Stewart-Moore of the 12th Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles, 36th
(Ulster) Division walked through Thiepval Wood toward the front lines. “As I
made my way there along the path,” he recalled: 
I met a deserter coming in the opposite direction. I reasoned with him and tried
to persuade him to return to his duty but he was obdurate, even if I had per-
suaded him to go back there was no likelihood that he could ever find his unit
and rejoin it. I suppose that by the strict letter of Military Law I should have
placed him under arrest and brought him before a Court Martial. In circum-
stances that was quite impossible, we were just two men in a wood and he was
probably the more powerful of the two so reluctantly I let him go and said
nothing — wonder what happened to him.1
Stewart-Moore’s private tale of desertion and circumvented duty was the exact
opposite of Captain Wilfrid Spender’s prominent publication, “The Ulstermen’s
Charge,” in which Spender famously declared: 
I am not an Ulsterman, but yesterday, on the first of July, as I followed their
amazing attack, I felt that I would rather be an Ulsterman than anything else
in the world …. Beginning at a slow walk over “No Man’s Land”, they then
suddenly let loose, as they charged over the two front lines of the enemy’s
1 Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM), 77/39/1, J.L. Stewart-Moore, “Random
Recollections,” 35. 
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trenches shouting “No surrender, boys” …. The Ulster Division lost very
heavily, and in doing so sacrificed itself for the Empire.2
Together, these two accounts — Spender’s epic image of the 36th Division
going over the top and Stewart-Moore’s matter-of-fact description of desertion
occurring the very same day — capture the essential tensions between public
and private representations of Ulster masculinities on the Western Front during
the Great War. Spender was an example of Unionist propagandists who had no
conception of desertion in their version of the war, while Stewart-Moore was a
soldier on the front lines without a party affiliation or political agenda.3 As with
other soldiers in the First World War, the discrepancy between appearance and
reality of Ulstermen on the battlefield was very wide. 
This paper examines idealized representations of Unionist Ulstermen in the
Great War,4 and the political ramifications this warrior imagery created in the
years following the armistice. Representations of Ulster masculinities in the
popular press were statements of power about what seemed to be real, as
opposed to actual fact. Obviously, this theme was not restricted to the north of
Ireland. The association of masculine virtue with soldiering and a martial
atmosphere was a source of national strength for numerous countries during the
era of the Great War. The notion that a true man had to serve a higher ideal
stood as a central idea behind the militarization of masculinity.5
What did set Ulster apart, however, was the blatant use of the war by pro-
British politicians and their supporters to propagate the stereotype that the
north-east corner of Ireland was uniformly Protestant, Unionist, and loyal to the
36th (Ulster) Division, which had gone over the top on the first day of the Battle
of the Somme, 1 July 1916. Unionists believed that their war experience had
been unique and that the men who had fought in the 36th Division had rede-
fined heroism unlike any other unit in the war. Depictions of the Ulster
Division’s manliness on the Western Front facilitated revisionist histories of the
war in the years immediately after the armistice that were heavily biased in
favour of Ulster Protestant-Unionism, at the expense of nationalist and Catholic
veterans. The actions of the 36th (Ulster) Division at the Somme in July 1916
were commandeered by biased politicians, newspapers, and, occasionally, his-
torians who transformed the image Ulstermen in uniform into a monolith of
2 Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (hereafter PRONI), Carson Papers, D.1507/A/18/2,
Captain Wilfrid B. Spender, “The Attack of the Ulstermen by a Staff Officer,” 2 July 1916.
Courtesy of Deputy Keeper of the Records at the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland.
3 IWM 77/39/1, Stewart-Moore, “Random Recollections,” 11–12. 
4 “Unionist” denotes a member of the Ulster Unionist Party, while “unionist” represents the
broader community which wished to maintain the British connection. The same style is also
used for “Nationalist” and “nationalist.” 
5 George L. Mosse, The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 44. 
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Protestant-Unionist sensibilities. This modern mythology simultaneously lion-
ized the men of the 36th Division while discounting the experiences of the
all-Irish divisions who fought together on the western front. An analysis of the
36th Division’s manly reputation deepens our knowledge of masculinities in
the First World War by underscoring the political manipulation of masculine
imagery and language, and by adding the complexity of gender analysis to the
traditional paradigm of Protestant-Catholic relations in the period before the
partition of Ireland. 
World War I has been and continues to be a site of extensive debate within
studies of masculinities.6 Militarization was an important part of the relation-
ship between Irish communities and constructs of masculinity. In A Military
History of Ireland (1996), Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery propose that
Ireland is an island where war and the threat of war have shaped all aspects of
society and that it would not be surprising if further examinations reveal that
“an Irish military tradition turns out to be central to the Irish historical experi-
ence, and a key element in modern Irish identity.”7 I do not want to suggest that
expressions or ideals of manliness were by themselves the agents of change,
either on the battlefield or the home front; rather, I prefer to align my research
with Michael Roper’s suggestion that investigations of masculinities tend “to
work within, rather than to recast, established topics and chronologies.”8 In the
following argument, masculinity serves as a lens for analyzing interpretations
of militarization, nationalism, loyalism, and communal identities. As R.W.
Connell has written, examinations of manliness and masculinities highlight
issues of marginalization and resistance and illuminate the implications gen-
dered scenarios have in terms of bodily experience, identity construction, and
cultural expression.9 Perceptions of manliness in a martial environment are
measures of power relationships between men, incorporating such characteris-
tics as fraternalism, heroism, fellowship, and, conversely, adversarial
fractiousness. Different expressions of manliness in a given society can reveal
not only social ideals and dogma, but histories of the emotions and the concept
of war as a gendered experience for men. 
6 For example, see T.G. Ashplant, Fractured Loyalties: Masculinity, Class and Politics in
Britain, 1900-1930 (London: Rivers Oram Press, 2007); Joanna Bourke, Dismembering The
Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain, and the Great War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996);
Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of
Masculinities (London: Routledge, 1994); and Mosse, The Image of Man. 
7 Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery, “An Irish military tradition?” in A Military History of
Ireland, eds. Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 2. 
8 Michael Roper, “Between Manliness and Masculinity: The ‘War Generation’ and the
Psychology of Fear in Britain, 1914–1950,” Journal of British Studies 44 (April 2005): 343. 
9 R.W. Connell, The Men and The Boys (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 8 and 29. 
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Masculinities within the context of Ulster’s participation in the Great War
involve the popular images of soldiers, as depicted in newspapers and political
propaganda, as well as the private thoughts of the men themselves recorded in
war diaries, letters, and memoirs. Irish Unionists, particularly those in Ulster,
the north-east province of the country, wished to maintain all political and
social connections with Great Britain, whereas Irish Nationalists desired some
form of increased independence from Westminster, ranging in form from Home
Rule to militant republicanism.10 While often heavily biased, newspapers are
crucial to this time period, both for their printed opinions and for their con-
flicting reports of key events that divided the Protestant and Catholic
communities in Ulster. The Belfast News-Letter, Northern Whig, Belfast Weekly
News, and Belfast Evening Telegraph consistently demonstrated unionist read-
ership and sympathies. Conversely, the Irish News and Irish Independent were
notably nationalistic in their tone and editorials, although not necessarily repub-
lican. Newspaper coverage of the First World War exemplified cases of manly
appearance versus reality taken to an extreme level, with public representations
of heroism and sacrifice overwhelming the actual experiences and motivations
of individual men in uniform, not in the least because, by 1916, the Western
Front had become an extension of Irish domestic politics. 
Throughout their various political and cultural campaigns, each camp
greatly influenced idealized images of Ireland and of Irishmen within the pub-
lic sphere. Unionist society expected Ulstermen fighting in France and Flanders
to correspond to a specific image of warrior masculinity that incorporated the
popular mythology of Ulster’s sacrificial blood-debt, the belief that by dying in
battle for the empire, Unionists would forever bind Ulster to Great Britain as its
“Imperial Province,” a haven for Protestant loyalist soldiers and their support-
ers.11 Violent bloodshed also characterized part of the nationalist vision of Irish
manhood. Patrick Pearse, the organizer of the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin,
believed that bloodshed was “a cleansing and a sanctifying thing.”12 For
Pearse, and those who shared his interpretation of violence within nationalist
and unionist circles, martyrdom was an indisputable means for men to prove
their worth as Irishmen. As George Mosse argues, dying on the battlefield pro-
duced analogies to Golgotha and Christ-like male sacrifice for some men in
10 For key histories of the Third Home Rule Crisis, see Timothy Bowman, Carson’s Army: The
Ulster Volunteer Force 1910–22 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); David
Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, 1912–1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Alvin
Jackson, Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800–2000 (London: Phoenix, 2003); and A.T.Q.
Stewart, The Ulster Crisis: Resistance to Home Rule 1912–1914, first published 1967 (Belfast:
The Blackstaff Press, 1997). 
11 PRONI, T.2346/1, Sir Edward Carson addressing the Ulster Division, 1919. 
12 Pádraic H. Pearse, Collected Works: Political Writings and Speeches (Dublin: Phoenix Press,
1924), 98–9. 
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arms, so that “pain and suffering combined with the will to sacrifice counted
toward an education in manliness.”13
While nationalist imagery stemming from 1916 focused on the martyr-
dom of the Irishmen in the Easter Rising, unionists created their own cultural
space for those who had sacrificed their lives on the battlefields of France
and Flanders the same year. The living legacy of the unionist blood-debt was
visible in commemorations of the war, including public parades and memo-
rial dedications that combined notions of Ulster’s patriotism and loyalty to
the Crown with the attendance of local Orange and Protestant societies.14
The role of local remembrance after the armistice, as opposed to mandated
public ceremonies organized by the Belfast Parliament, increased the rele-
vance of unionist sacrifice in people’s daily lives.15 It was within this tension
between public legend and private lived experience that communities
throughout the north of Ireland were able to fashion the most potent repre-
sentations of Ulster masculinities in war. These depictions found expression
in popular imagery, iconography, ideals, social stereotypes, engrained com-
munal assumptions, and chronicled observances of both a personal and
public nature. The apparent power of men over other men in the trenches and
Unionist society’s need for its soldiers to fit the trappings of traditional hero-
ism helped to shape the debate about Ulster’s future within the British
Empire and greatly affected how the First World War was remembered in
Ireland. 
Many of the depictions of Ulstermen in the Great War trace their origins to
the near-civil war that occurred in Ulster from 1912 to 1914, as Unionists and
Nationalists threatened each other over the implementation of the Third Home
Rule Bill. The idea of a domestic parliament based in Dublin appealed to Irish
Nationalists, but caused Ulster Unionists to take an extremely defensive posi-
tion in political and social circles over what they saw as a blatant attack on their
rights of British citizenship. Hostilities increased to the point where Unionists
threatened armed resistance in the Solemn League and Covenant of 1912 and
smuggled in some 20,000 rifles and two million rounds of ammunition during
the Larne gunrunning of April 1914.16
Popular representations of masculinities during the Home Rule Crisis
involved images of men bound together through fraternal societies such as the
Protestant Orange Order or the Catholic Ancient Order of Hibernians, and as
13 Mosse, The Image of Man, 112. 
14 Catherine Switzer, Unionists and Great War Commemoration in the north of Ireland
1914–1939 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 113. 
15 Ibid., 153. 
16 National Archives at Kew, London (hereafter NA), Chief Secretary’s Office, Judicial Division
(hereafter CSOJD), CO904/93, Inspector General’s Monthly Confidential Report for April
1914, 3.
8
JOURNAL OF THE CHA 2009 / REVUE DE LA S.H.C.
enthusiastic volunteers in paramilitary organizations, particularly the Ulster
Volunteer Force and the Irish National Volunteers, both of which had over
100,000 recruits by 1914.17 The stereotype of the Unionist Ulsterman at this
time was of a stubborn and dour northerner who was business-oriented as
opposed to artistic, wearing an Orange sash and a bowler hat as he affixed his
name to the Solemn League and Covenant of 1912. Ultimately, the “honest
Ulsterman” was a relic of Victorianism and the Irish Protestant Ascendancy to
his enemies and a symbol of strength, solidity, reliability, and shared values to
his supporters.18 Unionist and Nationalist propaganda each depicted their com-
munities as romantic defenders of hearth, home, and faith against an aggressive
enemy. The pro-unionist Northern Whig revelled in the fact that there were
“tens of thousands of men who are prepared to surrender personal advantage,
personal ambition, and personal ease in order to defend their altars and their
hearths,” while the nationalist Irish News felt events like the public signing of
the Ulster Covenant was not “anything better than the device of bullies.”19 By
the summer of 1914, tensions between these groups and the British government
had escalated to the point where the looming threat of war came not from
Sarajevo or Berlin, but Belfast. 
However, this shadow of violence was just a beginning. The most telling
assessment of Ulster’s martial masculinities was not decided in Belfast or
Derry, but on foreign battlefields with Unionists and Nationalists both serving
as volunteers in the British army. The Great War became the ultimate event that
judged whether or not Ulstermen were worthy of the heroic accolades that had
been bandied about in the public sphere prior to August 1914.20 Once the con-
flict moved to the western front, the sense of manly adventurism associated
with drilling and gunrunning during the Home Rule Crisis combined with
Victorian and Edwardian romantic imagery to inform Ulster Unionism’s popu-
lar vision of imperial heroism and martyrdom. 
The figure of the masculine hero at the turn of the twentieth-century cen-
tred on notions such as adventure, bravery, and sacrifice, tracing its lineage
back to the medieval chivalric code and the image of the “perfect knight.”
Victorian culture’s keen interest in medieval romanticism meant that, by the
time of the Great War, conditioning in courtly manners had become so
engrained, its characteristics were an expected style of behaviour, particularly
among upper and middle class men, many of whom were about to become offi-
17 Ibid., CO904/94, Inspector General’s Monthly Confidential Report for July 1914, 11; David
Fitzpatrick, “The Logic of Collective Sacrifice: Ireland and the British Army 1914–1918,” The
Historical Journal 38 (December 1995): 1027–8. 
18 Clare O’Halloran, Partition and the Limits of Irish Nationalism (Atlantic Highlands:
Humanities Press International, 1987), 41. 
19 Northern Whig (30 September 1912); Irish News (27 September 1912). 
20 Larne Times and Weekly Telegraph (2 May 1914). 
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cers in the trenches.21 For instance, the Young Citizen Volunteers, originally
formed in Belfast in September of 1912, used this idealistic philosophy in the
language of their constitution, noting their desire “to cultivate, by means of mod-
ified military and police drill, a manly physique, with habits of self control, self
respect, and chivalry.”22 Although the outfit claimed to be a non-political orga-
nization along the lines of the Boys Brigade or the Boy Scouts, by 1913 it had
aligned itself with the Ulster Unionist Council and the Ulster Volunteer Force.23
Within two years of their founding, the Young Citizen Volunteers was trans-
formed into the 14th Royal Irish Rifles of the 36th (Ulster) Division, bringing
popular notions of gentlemanly-heroism with them into Kitchener’s New Army. 
The popularity of muscular Christianity further enhanced this vision of the
noble warrior in a modern war, adding the requisite elements of religious fer-
vour and physical achievement to the dignified morals of the fighting
gentleman. Muscular Christianity presented the entire male body as a robust
symbol of virility, strength, and courage.24 This philosophy merged with the
cult of chivalry at the turn of the century to create high expectations for mod-
ern military officers. Discipline, duty, and willing sacrifice on the battlefield
were idealized themes that established common ground between officers of the
middle and upper classes, so that the chivalric code itself became a site for rec-
onciliation between warrior masculinities from different social strata.25
Soldiers from the 36th Division, who had been no strangers to the confluence
of religion and militarization during the Home Rule Crisis, would be able to
demonstrate their devotion to the Crown, the empire and Protestant ideals dur-
ing the Great War, while simultaneously proving their mettle in battle. 
The Somme perhaps best encapsulated the dichotomy of public represen-
tation and private experience within Ulster masculinities. Beginning some ten
weeks after the Easter Rising in Dublin, the Somme held special significance
for Ulster Unionists and Protestants. According to the Julian calendar, the first
of July corresponded with the 12th, the most important day in the Orange cal-
endar, a coincidence which historians later used to underscore the mythical
portents of the day. According to historian D.G. Boyce, the Somme was a key
symbolic event that proved Ulstermen’s “emergence as a distinct people with a
special history, one almost guided by providence.”26 Similarly, historian Philip
21 Mark Girouard, The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1981), 16–17. 
22 PRONI, D.1568/3, Constitution and Bye-Laws of the YCV of Ireland. 
23 David Fitzpatrick, “Militarism in Ireland, 1900–1922,” in A Military History of Ireland, 383. 
24 Mosse, 49. 
25 Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes, 108–9. 
26 D.G. Boyce, “‘That Party Politics Should Divide Our Tents’: Nationalism, Unionism and the
First World War,” in Ireland and the Great War: ‘A War To Unite Us All’?, eds. Adrian Gregory
and Senita Pašeta (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 191. 
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Orr wrote, “From the Boyne to the Ancre, the thread of history seemed to run
clear.”27 By going over the top on the original anniversary of the Battle of the
Boyne, the story of the men of the 36th was characterized to demonstrate that
they not only fought to prove their prowess and position within the empire, but
also to defend the cultural legacy of Protestant Ulster. 
According to written reports and historical legend, the traditions of Ulster’s
fraternal societies were in evidence the morning of 1 July 1916, as the 36th
Division climbed out of the trenches. There are accounts, possibly exaggerated,
that some men in the line wore orange lilies in their tunics to commemorate the
anniversary of the Boyne, while others wore Orange sashes and held
impromptu lodge meetings in the trenches.28 The historic battle-cry of “No
Surrender” allegedly led the Ulstermen into the fray, with the soldiers of the
36th becoming a modern tribute to the Apprentice Boys from the Siege of Derry
in 1690, although the probability of hearing such a shout is rather dubious.29
Lieutenant Colonel Ambrose Ricardo of the 9th Battalion, Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers, was one of those who watched the waves of men walking forward
toward the German lines. According to official history of the division written
by 36th Division veteran Cyril Falls, Ricardo 
stood on the parapet between the two centre exits to wish them luck. They got
through without delay; no fuss, no shouting, no running, everything solid and
thorough — just like the men themselves. Here and there a boy would wave
his hand to me as I shouted a good luck to them through my megaphone. And
all had a cheery face.30
Falls’ account was typical of an official military history that indulged in opti-
mistic rhetoric and nostalgia.31 At first, the division succeeded in achieving its
objectives, capturing five lines of German trenches; however, without support
from other divisions along the front lines, the men were soon stranded in enemy
territory. Once the counter-attack began, the division’s success quickly slipped
away. By nightfall, some battalions were still clinging to German lines, but at a
heavy price. Near midnight, Stewart-Moore recalled that “an Infantry officer
came into our dugout completely exhausted: ‘We have been fighting all day,’
he said, ‘And we have got nowhere’.”32
27 Philip Orr, The Road to the Somme: Men of the Ulster Division Tell Their Story (Belfast: The
Blackstaff Press, 1987), 161. 
28 Ibid., 164–5. 
29 PRONI, Carson Papers, D.1507/A/18/2, Captain Wilfrid B. Spender, “The Attack of the
Ulstermen by a Staff Officer,” 2 July 1916. 
30 Quoted in Cyril Falls, The History of the 36th (Ulster) Division (Belfast: McCaw, Stevenson
and Orr, 1922), 52. 
31 See Bryan Cooper, The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli (1918) for a similar tone and emphasis.
32 IWM, 77/39/1, Stewart-Moore, “Random Recollections,” 36. 
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British forces at the Somme suffered 60,000 casualties on 1 July 1916,
nearly half of the infantry engaged, 20,000 of whom were killed. It remains the
greatest loss for a single day of combat in British history. The Ulster Division
experienced the fourth highest number of losses with 5,104 casualties, some
2,000 of whom died.33 In the face of such suffering, however, the diary of the
14th Royal Irish Rifles immediately evoked the theme of epic bravery in
recording of the death of 2nd Lieutenant Wedgewood, who “was only a child
but had the heart of a lion.”34 Corporal W.S. Nicol wrote to his mother that he
was “sure the North of Ireland will be in an awful state when the news is all
known, but it has to be done.”35 When the news came, it was shocking, with
reports that there had never been “anything finer than the way our successive
waves of men marched, singing and cheering, into that bath of lead.”36 As a
whole, the Battle of the Somme cost Britain and the empire more than 400,000
casualties, and the territory gained was little more than six miles. In terms of
winning the war, the 36th Division’s contribution was negligible. Yet Unionist
Ulstermen claimed this battle as their greatest moment since the Boyne, a time
that redefined who and what they were, and which lent new strength to the age-
old question of what their position within Ireland and the British Empire would
be. Following the slaughter of the Somme, communal belief in heroic martyr-
dom and the nobility of sacrifice became northern society’s strongest weapon
against despair. 
As news of the province’s losses became known, the Northern Whig pub-
licly declared, “We were never prouder of our province and our race than we
are at this moment, for it means more today than it ever did to be an
Ulsterman.” An editorial the same day proposed that the Ulster Division was “a
unique unit in the British Army. It is composed of Covenanters who had bound
themselves together with the object of resisting attacks on their hard-won lib-
erties …. The blood of the slain cries to heaven for vengeance, and we owe it
to the dead as well as to the living to prosecute the war with renewed vigour.”37
The Belfast News-Letter concurred, adding that the “heroism and self-sacrifice
of the Ulstermen in particular continues to be the theme of mournful praise, and
henceforth in Ulster the 1st of July will have a new and more glorious, if more
sorrowful meaning, into which no shade of contention can enter.”38 Willing
sacrifice and undying loyalty were two of the revered characteristics from the
code of warrior masculinities. After the Somme, newspapers and politicians
33 Peter Hart, The Somme (London: Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2006), 162. 
34 IWM, DS/MISC/18, War Diary, 14th Royal Irish Rifles (YCV), 1915–1918, 1 July 1916. 
35 IWM 85/4/1, W.S. Nicol, letter to his mother, 5 July 1916. 
36 Belfast News-Letter (6 July 1916). 
37 Northern Whig (7 July 1916). 
38 Belfast News-Letter (5 July 1916). 
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used their authority within the public sphere to suggest that formerly impracti-
cal ideals had been made into a reality on the battlefield by the 36th Ulsters. 
In the search for meaning after the Somme, those analyzing the 36th
Division changed the reality of their appalling losses into a modern legend of
Ulster manliness. Tributes came from private individuals and public figures.
William John Lynas, a 27-year-old rifleman in the 107th Infantry Brigade,
Royal Irish Rifles, was also an Orangeman and had been in the North Belfast
unit of the Ulster Volunteer Force prior to the war. Nearly two weeks after the
slaughter, he wrote home to his wife describing the heroics of the men he had
fought with: 
I need hardly begin to tell you about the gallantry of our boys for I am sure you
have read more in the papers than I am fit to tell you. Their [sic] is one thing
Mina they did not disgrace the name of Ulster or their Fore-fathers little did
you think as you sat writing your letter on the first day of July that our boys had
mounted the top and made a name for Ulster that will never die in the annals
of history. No doubt Belfast to-day and the rest of Ulster is in deep mourning
for the dear ones that has given their life so manly may the Lord comfort all of
those who have lost a beloved Husband a Brother a Son … their [sic] is one
great comfort to know that they fell doing their duty for King and Country.39
Lynas used the language of traditional chivalry in order to impress upon his
wife his conviction that the “gallantry” and “duty” displayed by his fellow
Ulstermen had been an act of historic consequence and had not dishonoured
their ancestors. He believed that the men dying in “so manly” a fashion “for
King and Country” would be a comfort to those receiving news of the battle at
home, an opinion that underscored the links in Unionist society between mas-
culinity, soldiering, and familial pride. 
Lynas’ sentiments about duty’s role in the manly construction of the 36th
Division echoed the Belfast News-Letter’s suggestion that the Somme had
allowed Ulster to prove 
the reality of her Imperialism. Her sons have demonstrated to all the world that
their loyalty to King and Country is no empty thing, and when the first sharp
sense of bereavement has passed the relatives of those who have paid the
supreme price will derive comfort from the knowledge that in the winning of
the great triumph which will surely come their fathers, sons, and brothers
played a heroic part.40
Another article in the same edition described how the division served as “a
superb example of what discipline, good leading, and magnificent spirit can
39 IWM, 89/7/1, W.J. Lynas, letter to his wife, 15 July 1916. 
40 Belfast News-Letter (8 July 1916). 
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make men capable of performing.”41 In agreeing with this assessment of the
division’s character, the Most Reverend Dr. Crozier, the Church of Ireland
Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of all Ireland, was reported to have said
that he “expected nothing else. They are of the stock from which our heroes
come and to whom our Empire owes so much — unconquered and unconquer-
able. I spent a considerable time with them last January in France and I can
testify to their patience and pluck as well as to their chivalry and courtesy.”42
Clearly, chivalric heroism was a central aspect of the public construction of
Ulster’s warrior masculinities after the Somme offensive. Military service and
sacrifice stood as powerful symbols of Ulster’s loyalty to the empire. These
beliefs, shaped by men in the field and in the consolation offered by the media
and public figures, suggested that any man, regardless of rank, was capable of
making a difference through commitment to the war effort and demonstrations
of epic heroism and courage. 
That opinion was strengthened by the glowing reports from Philip Gibbs,
the official British correspondent at the front. Knowing that public support was
vitally important after the forces had sustained such heavy casualties, he wrote
that the Ulstermen’s attack on 1 July had been one of “the greatest revelations
of human courage ever seen in history.” Making use of Protestant Ulster’s leg-
endary traditions from the seventeenth century, he added that it was the men of
the 36th 
who shouted, “No Surrender!” as their battle-cry, and these tough, hard, gal-
lant men forced their way forward over ground raked by every kind of shot
and shell. The enemy’s trenches could not resist their attack, and they stormed
their way through, killing many of the enemy who resisted them. In Thiepval
Wood, where the trees were slashed by shrapnel, they collected their strength,
formed into line, and stood the shock of several German counter-attacks. Then
they charged and flung down the enemy’s ranks, taking more than 200 pris-
oners.43
Gibbs publicly encouraged the idea that warrior masculinity, instilled in the
Ulster Volunteer Force prior to the outbreak of war, had been actualized in bat-
tle. He wrote that the Ulstermen were “tough and “hard,” yet also “gallant,”
killing the enemy by storming the trenches and charging the line, phrases which
lent an air of knightly mystique to their achievements. 
Similarly, at St. Anne’s Church of Ireland Cathedral in Belfast, Dean C.T.P.
Grierson noted that the Protestant community was “proud of the Ulster
Volunteers and of their sterling manhood,” a statement which strengthened the
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Philip Gibbs, The Battles of the Somme (London: William Heinemann, 1917), 63. 
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link between demonstrations of epic bravery at the Somme and the soldiers’
past membership in the Ulster Volunteer Force.44 The Reverend Dr. Henry
Montgomery, the 1912 Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, went
even further at an evening service recorded at Albert Hall in Shankill Road on
9 July, declaring to his audience: “One little thought when in September 1912,
the gallant youth of Ulster signed their Solemn League and Covenant that so
many of them would before four years had passed have sealed it with their
blood on the battlefields of France and Flanders.”45 This was the blood-debt
realized for those who shared Montgomery’s point of view, the culmination of
all the efforts made during the Home Rule Crisis and after which publicly
demonstrated the apparent unflinching fidelity and constancy of Ulster
Unionists in uniform. The blood shed at the Somme now demanded Britain’s
allegiance to Ulster in return for the 36th Division’s heavy sacrifice. This belief
grew in popularity and prestige. In 1921, the Belfast Telegraph recalled the
“bulldog tenacity and courage of our northern race,” who had “volunteered and
gave of their best on the bloody fields of Flanders and elsewhere.”46 The same
year, the Belfast Weekly News noted that although three years had passed since
the end of the war, “the heroism and devotion of those who died fighting for the
Empire … are remembered with pride and thanksgiving.”47 Ulster had fought
and now England owed her an equal measure of loyalty. 
These poetic tributes are not to suggest, however, that the men themselves
saw their exploits in such a triumphant or significant light. Most likely, few
men in the field cared about what their actions said regarding the strength of
Ulster manliness or the dominance of Protestant Unionists in Ulster, particu-
larly when they were consumed with thoughts of the actual battle at hand. This
was the context for J.L. Stewart-Moore’s encounter with the deserter in the
woods, a realistic moment between two men in battle that held no overtones of
romanticizing violence or solidifying Ulster Protestant mythology. In 1966,
during the 50th anniversary of the events of 1916, Malcolm McKee, a veteran
of the 36th, went further and railed against the stupidity of the Somme, sav-
aging those who over-mythologized the significance of the battle. “How many
would have known the Boyne was fought on the first of July?” he asked, con-
tinuing, “I don’t know why they plaster such incidents on our battle. Nothing
was further from my mind than the Boyne on the Somme.”48
In spite of this anger, however, events like the Somme created cultural
touchstones in Ulster. Although McKee might not have liked how the Somme
was caught up in Unionist imagery, it cannot be denied that it became part of
44 Northern Whig (10 July 1916). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Belfast Telegraph (14 June 1921). 
47 Belfast Weekly News (17 November 1921). 
48 Belfast Telegraph (30 June 1966). 
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the new masculine mythology for the province. The romantic descriptions of
Ulstermen going over the top were a distortion of actual experiences, but reac-
tions to the symbolism of the 36th Division were very real. In The Web of
Government, R.M. MacIver defined the difference between techniques and
myths. “A technique,” he wrote, “is a way of knowing that is primarily a way
of control … a way of manipulating objects, including persons as objects.”
Contrary to this, myths denote “the value-impregnated beliefs and notions that
men hold, that they live by or live for.”49 Unionist authorities and propagandists
used the technique of lionizing the manliness of the 36th Division in order to
create a cultural myth that incorporated the political landscape of the Home
Rule debate, the social schisms between Protestants and Catholics in the north,
and Ulster’s longstanding tradition of military strength. It was a legend that 
carried with it the authority of popular communal memories, completely over-
whelming any public forum for personal experiences in the trenches that
countered its powerful resonance. 
Perhaps one of the most telling examples of this clash between the personal
and the popular was the other blood-debt incurred by Irish troops at the Somme
— this time by the 16th (Irish) Division in September of 1916. The 16th (Irish)
was an outfit made up of both Protestants and Catholics, although the sectarian
recruiting policies of the 36th Division ensured that nearly all Ulster Catholics
who fought on the Western Front were part of the 16th, with the exception of
four men, including John M. Regan, a future Catholic officer in the Royal
Ulster Constabulary.50 David Starrett, batman to Brigadier General F.P. Crozier,
recalled in his war memoir that he had nearly been attacked in the predomi-
nately Catholic Scotland Road district of Liverpool while recruiting for the
16th Division, as his assailants thought he only represented “the bloody hand
of Carson.” However, as he recalled, “from shouting we fell to talking and
presently some of them accompanied me to the office, saying up to now no one
had told them we recruited Catholics as well as Protestants.”51 Although the
enlistment of the 16th Division generally reflected volunteers from southern
Ireland, Ulster Catholics and nationalists enlisted at a rate that, according to his-
torian David Fitzpatrick, was just as impressive as that of their fellow
Ulstermen in the 36th Division.52 Scarcely two months after the 36th Division’s
assault at Thiepval, the 16th Division lost nearly half its 11,000 men and offi-
cers at Guillemont and Ginchy.53 Like the Ulster Division’s experience, success
for the 16th in the September push had little effect, if any, on the general out-
49 R.M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 4. 
50 John M. Regan, The Memoirs of John M. Regan: A Catholic Officer in the RIC and RUC,
1909–48, ed. Joost Augusteijn (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), 97–100. 
51 IWM 79/35/1, David Starret, “Batman,” 29–30. 
52 Fitzpatrick, “The Logic of Collective Sacrifice,” 1030. 
53 Myles Dungan, Irish Voices from the Great War (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1995), 147. 
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come of the war. The Somme, with its great appetite for destruction, treated all
Irishmen equally. 
Among the dead at Ginchy was Thomas Kettle, the Irish Nationalist politi-
cian, poet, and scholar. Kettle has since come to encompass the irony of Irish
Nationalists in British uniforms, motivated to fight not only because of the mil-
itarization sweeping across Ireland in that period, but also because of his
sacrificial interpretation of Catholicism.54 An article, written for publication
only days before his death, described his hopes for reconciliation between
northern Protestants and the rest of Ireland. He wrote that, during the war, he
had 
mixed much with Englishmen and Protestant Ulstermen, and I know that there
is no real or abiding reason for the gulfs, saltier than the sea, that now dis-
member the natural alliance of both of them with us Irish Nationalists …. In
the name, and by the seal, of the blood given in the last two years, I ask for
Colonial Home Rule for Ireland, a thing essential in itself, and essential as a
prologue for the reconstruction of the Empire. Ulster will agree.55
Kettle set the Nationalist blood-debt into words with this passage, expressing
the hope that Irish deaths in the Great War would force Britain to grant Home
Rule immediately, which was the exact opposite of the blood-debt Ulster
Unionists felt they had created at Thiepval. In the long term, Unionism’s blood-
debt proved to be the stronger of the two, despite Kettle’s pointed desire for an
end to sectarian tensions between Irishmen and his eventual adoption as a sym-
bol of nationalist and unionist reconciliation for activists and scholars.56 The
death of Irish constitutional nationalism in favour of Irish republicanism by the
war’s end ensured that Kettle’s proffered blood-sacrifice was tragically mean-
ingless for decades after his death. 
Moreover, the participation of thousands of soldiers from nationalist
Ireland became a public embarrassment to the republican movement even to the
point, according to historian Myles Dungan, that some ex-servicemen were shot
by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) during the Irish War of Independence.57
Enlistment in the British army did not fit with either the manliness of the patri-
otic martyrs who had been in the Easter Rising of 1916, or with the actions of
those fighting in the Irish War of Independence. By the time of the Irish
Conscription Crisis in 1918, unionist newspapers such as the Belfast Evening
Telegraph tarred Irish Nationalists as having been “petted and pampered for
54 Senia Pašeta, “Thomas Kettle: ‘An Irish soldier in the army of Europe’?” in Ireland and the
Great War: “A War To Unite Us All”?, 16. 
55 Quoted in Rowland Fielding, War Letters to a Wife. France and Flanders, 1915–1919, ed.
Jonathan Walker (Staplehurst: Spellmount Limited, 2001, first published in 1929), 81. 
56 Thomas Kettle, The Open Secret of Ireland, ed. Senia Pašeta (Dublin: UCD Press, 2007), xiii. 
57 Dungan, Irish Voices from the Great War, 202. 
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years,” acting like “spoiled children, crying that they do not get the moon when
they ask for it …. They may have sentiment and poetry on their side, but senti-
ment and poetry will neither butter parsnips nor provide armies or navies or
implements of labour or protection.”58 According to the Evening Telegraph,
Nationalists were guilty of unmanly softness and delicacy in a time of war.59
The values and virtues of normative masculinity in Ulster, embodied by
Unionist Ulstermen fighting in the trenches for the empire, were strengthened
by creating a war of words with “the other”, in this case, Irishmen who did not
support conscription and who were subsequently labelled as social enemies.
The Evening Telegraph argued that Unionist men who supported conscription
were the true symbol for martial manliness, providing the force behind eco-
nomic strength and war-time employment while also serving as the active
defenders of Irish society in contrast to Irish Nationalism’s feminine attributes
of poetry, pampering, childishness, and indecision. This effeminacy could also
be seen in a different manner, with pro-conscription and anti-conscription
Irishmen representing a split family dynamic. In her discussion of American
masculinity since Vietnam, Linda E. Boose proposes that war protestors and
participants share in a “bad son/good son binary,” which ultimately involves “a
matter of failing the father.”60 Within the context of Ulster in the final year of
the war, unionist newspapers proposed that the “good son” dutifully embraced
martial masculinity, whereas the “bad son” was sentimental, effete, and, ulti-
mately, failed to serve the king, the father-figure of British imperialism. 
Even more potent, however, than imperial patriarchal relationships were
the widespread signs of growing fraternalism between Irish divisions on the
Western Front in 1917, particularly at Messines Ridge and Passchendaele.
Fraternalism in this context refers to feelings of unity and fellowship created by
means of cooperation and shared experience among men throughout the army
corps. Sarah Benton has defined brotherhood as a system of organization stress-
ing unity, selflessness, loyalty, and secrecy to such an extent that it shapes other
social relations.61 In this argument, brotherhood includes not only these factors,
but also incorporates the theme of sibling rivalry, as Irish soldiers overcame
political and religious divisions through competition, sport, banter, and, ulti-
mately fighting alongside rather than against each other. In the earliest days of
the war, the Nationalist Irish News printed a poem submitted by a Belfast mem-
ber of the Ulster Volunteer Force and a “prominent Irish Volunteer” from
58 Belfast Evening Telegraph (9 April 1918). 
59 Mosse, 55. 
60 Linda E. Boose, “Techno-Muscularity and the ‘Boy Eternal’: From the Quagmire to the Gulf”
in Gendering War Talk, eds. Miriam Cooke and Angela Woolacott (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1993), 89–90. 
61 Sarah Benton, “Women Disarmed: The Militarization of Politics in Ireland 1913–1923,”
Feminist Review (The Irish Issue: The British Question) 50 (1995): 162. 
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Antrim, which read: “Ulstermen, Munstermen, Connachtmen, Leinstermen /
Faithful to Erin we answer her call … / We have our differences, not very many,
/ Soon they’ll be fewer — we’re Irishmen all!”62 Once in the trenches, the iron-
clad differences from the home front changed into something more sociable,
even affable, supported by reports and memoirs meant for public consumption,
including those by Bryan Cooper, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, David Starrett, and
William W. Johnson.63 R.F.E. Evans of the 36th Division recalled that
Protestants and Catholics would 
stand shoulder to shoulder with the other, though out of the line they often
fought in the best North versus South tradition. What a set-to with fists and
belts there would be in some estament [sic] behind the lines, where the men
of the 16th were drinking, should some of the 36th barge in, provocatively
shouting “To hell with the Pope!” But in battle this was all forgotten and they
were the most loyal comrades in arms.64
General Sir Alexander Godley corroborated this story of banter and fellowship
in his memoir about life as an Irish soldier in the British military. He often
arranged dinners between General Nugent and Captain Saunderson, both
Unionists, and senior Nationalist Members of Parliament Stephen Gwynn and
Willie Redmond, brother of John, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party.
Godley recalled that during the meal, “the talk and arguments between the two
Unionist Orangemen of the black North, and the two Southern Home-Rulers …
would at times become rather heated; but I need hardly say that they always fin-
ished by falling on each other’s necks and were in reality the best of friends.”65
In this context, military friendships were stronger than domestic politics, at
least while the men remained in the field. 
While the officers discussed political issues at formal dinners, the rank and
file often used sport as a way to bridge the divide between them. Rowland
Fielding noted the attitude of the enlisted men during one of the many football
matches scheduled between soldiers of the 16th and 36th Divisions. Once, he
nearly had to stop the game because a German aeroplane appeared overhead.
However, he felt that to halt a match “in process of being cleanly fought before
a sporting audience between the two great opposing factions of Ireland, in a
spirit of friendliness which, so far as I am aware, seems unattainable on Ireland’s
native soil, was a serious matter; and I decided to let the game go on.”66
62 Irish News (6 August 1914). 
63 Cooper; The Tenth (Irish) Division (1918); IWM, 79/50/1, Papers of Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick,
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It is unclear whether this growing fraternalism occurred because different
geographic locations changed the men’s temperament and willingness to toler-
ate each other, or if it was a more pointed reaction to the fact that, while on the
Western Front, their homes and communities were not threatened by the men
who stood beside them in the trenches. Irish military historian Terence Denman
has stated that these moments of fraternalism carried little weight in determining
Ireland’s future, noting that friendships formed in the trenches were far less
important than what was occurring in Ireland itself.67 Historian David Fitzpatrick
concurs with this opinion, emphasizing in his work that, although political and
religious distinctions dimmed in the theatre of war, the “comradeship of the
trenches proved evanescent.”68 Although these criticisms are valid, I believe
the development of private and popular fellowship in the trenches deserves
greater emphasis, particularly within the historiography of Irish masculinities.
Even though these nascent feelings of brotherhood between Irish Catholics and
Protestants on the Western Front paled in comparison to the animosity and vio-
lence that erupted in Ireland once the war in Europe was over, it is important to
remember that these feelings of camaraderie, fraternalism, and understanding
did, in fact, exist. Whether a wartime reality or more of a cherished myth, this
heralded “friendship” between the 16th (Irish) and 36th (Ulster) Divisions was
an important homosocial development that should be highlighted in the histo-
riography primarily because it was forgotten so quickly after the war had
ended. 
One telling example of this brief period of mutual respect between
Irishmen occurred at Third Ypres. When Father William Doyle, an extremely
popular Catholic chaplain, was killed at Passchendaele, his death united both
the 36th and 16th Divisions in grief and underscored the growing tolerance and
understanding the soldiers had for one another within their paradigm of martial
manliness. An anonymous Belfast Orangeman provided a eulogy for Doyle,
printed in the Glasgow Weekly News, where he remembered: 
Father Doyle was a good deal among us. We couldn’t possibly agree with his
religious opinions, but we simply worshipped him for other things. He didn’t
know the meaning of fear, and he didn’t know what bigotry was …. If he
risked his life looking after Ulster Protestant soldiers once, he did it a hundred
times in his last few days. The Ulstermen felt his loss more keenly than any-
body, and none were readier to show their marks of respect to the dead hero
priest than were our Ulster Presbyterians.69
67 Terence Denman, Ireland’s Unknown Soldiers: The 16th (Irish) Division in the Great War,
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This public tribute emphasized Doyle’s place within the hierarchy of martial
masculinities as a brave and heroic comrade-in-arms, risking his life to bring
religious consolation to soldiers and ultimately dying in that pursuit. 
The unifying grief Father Doyle’s death created between Ulster
Presbyterians and Catholics in part fulfilled the desire expressed by Irish
Nationalist leader John Redmond in the early years of the war when he prayed
that “whenever a battalion of the Irish Brigade goes into action there may be a
battalion of the Ulster Division alongside them.”70 Redmond’s wish for
Catholics and Protestants to shed blood together on the Western Front was a
variation on the blood sacrifice motif. Redmond’s envisioned blood-debt would
not unite Ulster to Great Britain or grant Ireland independence, but instead bind
Irishman to Irishman, whether from Wexford, Galway, or Antrim. The bond
would still be fractious, as sibling relationships can be, but it would not be 
violent. However, by November 1918, Redmond was dead and his Irish
Parliamentary Party near the same. In the months and years following the
armistice, the power inherent in public representations of warrior masculinities
controlled war remembrance in the north and further dampened any common
feelings of fraternalism among Ulster’s ex-servicemen. 
By the war’s end, a pointedly political “industry of remembrance” existed
in the north of Ireland.71 Ulster Unionist politicians and propagandists exerted
the power of ideology and commemoration over the legacy of the province’s
ex-servicemen at a provincial and a local level.72 Those who had fought with
the 36th (Ulster) Division became martyrs to the Protestant-Unionist cause,
whereas veterans of the 10th (Irish) and 16th (Irish) Divisions pointedly were
overlooked and their contributions to Ulster’s military heritage ignored. When
Belfast’s Peace Day celebrations in 1919 were moved to 9 August instead of the
date of 19 July ordered by Royal Proclamation, Catholic and Nationalist ex-ser-
vicemen boycotted the event, feeling the date had been changed only for
political reasons.73 At a meeting of the Derry Branch of the Irish Nationalist
Veterans’ Association, a resolution was passed protesting against the Peace
Celebrations in Belfast and calling on all Nationalist ex-soldiers to refrain from
participating in it.74 An editorial in the nationalist Irish Independent that August
stressed that it had 
no desire to deprecate or minimise the gallantry and achievements of the men
of the 36th Ulster Division. They took a prominent part in every battle in
70 John Redmond, Mr Redmond’s Visit to the Front (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1915), 37. 
71 Nuala C. Johnson, Ireland, the Great War and the Geography of Remembrance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 60. 
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which they were engaged, and are quite entitled to wear the laurels they so
nobly won. All Irishmen are justly proud of their brave deeds, and Nationalist
soldiers would resent any attempt to cast a slur on their Ulster comrades in the
Great War. What we do object to is the deliberate attempt to represent the
Ulster Division and the Ulster Unionists as the only Irishmen who responded
to the call to the colours and took part in the world’s Armageddon …. This is
unjust and unfair alike to Unionists and Nationalists from the South of Ireland.
It is unfair to the thousands of Ulster and Belfast Nationalists who voluntarily
enlisted and joined other Irish regiments. It also ignored the many thousands
of Irishmen who served in English, Scottish, and overseas regiments. If the
Ulster Division has its heroes, who can deny to the 16th the honour of Major
Redmond, MP, and Capt. Thomas Kettle? The sacrifices of these men and oth-
ers who … should not be forgotten, although they were ignored at Belfast on
Saturday. The Ulster Division, petted and pampered by the Government, has
no more glorious record than belongs to the neglected 16th Division.75
The Irish News objected to the general tone of war commemorations in the
north, with good reason, as the war increasingly became the play-thing of polit-
ical and sectarian organizations. Two years later, the Belfast Weekly News, a
newspaper with pronounced Unionist sympathies, reported that while
Armistice Day in 1921 had been “solemnly observed” by Loyalists in Armagh,
Nationalists living in that county had not joined in any public remembrances.76
The ideological power inherent within war remembrances perhaps was
used to the greatest effect by the Orange Order. Traditional Orange parades for
the Twelfth of July and the organization’s presence at Armistice Day services
facilitated the Somme’s incorporation into Orange iconography. In its coverage
of the Twelfth of July in 1919, the Belfast News-Letter reminded its readers that
alongside the historic Orange slogans of “No Surrender” and “Ulster will fight
and Ulster will be right,” the phrases “‘Remember the Somme’, ‘Messines’ and
‘Thiepval’ are also words and names that must forever thrill the hearts of loyal
Irishmen, but especially those of Ulster birth, for they tell of unsurpassed deeds
of gallantry and glory.”77 The Irish News reported in July 1920 that the “only
fresh feature” in the Orange parades were new banners which “commemorated
the engagements of the Somme instead of the usual hackneyed and highly-
coloured paintings of ‘Derry, Aughrim, and the Boyne’.”78 In 1921, Ruby, 
Lady Carson, wife of Sir Edward Carson, the leader of Ulster Unionism during
the Third Home Rule Crisis, placed a wreath at the cenotaph in London from
the women of St Stephen’s Loyal Orange Lodge No. 133 with herself as 
the Worshipful Mistress. Its inscription read, “In undying memory of the 
75 Ibid. (11 August 1919). 
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brave Ulstermen of the Orange Order who made the supreme sacrifice in 
the Great War in order to preserve for all the world the ideals of liberty and 
freedom for which they lived and died.”79 Lady Carson’s position as a leader 
of the Orangewomen emphasized the connection between Ulster’s political
élite and the powerful Protestant organization. The Orange Order had enormous
influence on the reconstruction of recent history. The Ulster Division at 
the Somme became an intrinsic part of Orange and Unionist interpretations 
of the First World War, separate from any history of the fraternalism and 
solidarity that had existed once between Nationalists and Unionists in the
trenches. 
By comparison, nationalist veterans saw their history in the war quickly
turned into a badge of dishonour within the Irish Free State. The Belfast Weekly
News noted in 1921 that “except among Loyalists, Armistice Day was not
observed in Dublin. There was no general cessation of traffic and the vast halls
of the pedestrians kept on the move during the two minutes period, obviously
to mark their contempt for the anniversary.”80 Their loss was the Orangemen’s
gain.81 The order’s incorporation of and influence over memories of the
Somme encouraged notions that Ulstermen had fought solely for British impe-
rialism and the Protestant cause.82 Sir James Craig, Prime Minister of Northern
Ireland, announced at a Twelfth of July celebration in 1922, 
From the ranks of the Loyal Orange Institution came the old Ulster Volunteer
Force … which saved Ulster in 1914. From the ranks of the Loyal Orange
Institution came the grand 36th (Ulster) Division. There was no finer division
in the great war. It was also from the ranks of the Loyal Orange Institution that
our splendid Specials have come to protect our borderland.83
These words linked the north’s position within current volatile Irish politics and
the Ulster Special Constabulary to the wartime sacrifice of thousands of
Unionist Ulstermen, all under the auspices of the Orange Order. Through the
legacy of the Ulster Volunteer Force and the 36th Division, the government of
Northern Ireland and the Orange Order put themselves at the head of Ulster’s
tradition of Protestant fraternal societies, defining the character of the newly-
partitioned state through homosocial alliances and the modern mythology of
martial masculinities. Previously in 1919, the Lord Mayor of Belfast, J.C.
White, had emphasised the bond between the war and Ulster manliness when
he noted at a luncheon in memory of the 36th Division that “the frightful waste
79 Belfast Weekly News (17 November 1921). 
80 Ibid. 
81 Dungan, Irish Voices from the Great War, 203. 
82 Belfast News-Letter (5 July 1920). 
83 Northern Whig (13 July 1922). 
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of youthful vigour, in its first flush and pride, will not be fully realised till years
have passed …. But against that incalculable loss must be set the display of a
heroic self-sacrifice and romantic gallantry such as old war could never show
on the same scale.”84
Unionist political figures used the Great War as a communal symbol,
underlining the grief the province felt with the seemingly romantic achieve-
ments of the dead, and the blood-debt incurred. Meanwhile, the Irish
Independent, the pro-Home Rule anti-partition newspaper, proposed that for
some Nationalist veterans, this kind of rhetoric showed “a deliberate design to
glorify the 36th Ulster Division at the expense of the other Irish divisions and
regiments … for a political purpose,” even to the point where “the men com-
posing the Ulster Division may not be conscious of the fact that they are being
used.”85 Protestant-Unionist Ulster claimed the war’s legacies of heroism and
martyrdom as its own. This exclusionary revisionism removed the reality of
Protestants and Catholics fighting alongside one another from the public sphere
in favour of an ascendant Unionist mythology that constructed and confirmed
the dominance of Protestant-Unionist masculinity in the north. Reporting on the
dedication of the Thiepval Memorial at the Somme, the Belfast Weekly News
stated that there were 
many Ulstermen in other units than those who recruited to the 36th Division.
But the 36th was our own Volunteer Division, and the site chosen for the
memorial overlooks the battlefield on which our men were “blooded” and in
which they proved their valour and earned a fame that will go down in history
as one of the epics of the Great War …. The Ulster Division as a unit in the
field was … unique — it was the incarnation of the fighting spirit of the
Loyalists of the Province.86
Only after “victory” had been achieved in 1923 over northern divisions of the
IRA did unionist newspapers, such as the Belfast Telegraph, mention that other
Irish divisions had “fought with equal bravery in different theatres of war.”87
The efforts of Ulstermen in the First World War, particularly at the Battle
of the Somme, redefined public representations of martial masculinity for
Ulster Unionists. The notions of Victorian and Edwardian manliness that
emphasized the willing sacrifice of the gentleman-hero combined with new leg-
ends of valour and blood-debts on the battlefield to create a mythology that
resounded with Unionists throughout the rest of the century. After the war, R.L.
Greenway, a signaller for the 36th Division, believed that he would 
84 Irish News (11 August 1919). 
85 Irish Independent (11 August 1919). 
86 Belfast Weekly News (24 November 1921). 
87 Belfast Telegraph (29 June 1923). 
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never forget the good times we had together which, when I sit and think of
them, sometimes it makes me believe that it wasn’t such a bad old war after
all … It made Man kill Man, but it also taught Man to love Man, to stand by
him to the last. It created bonds of fellowship which Peace could not, and
never will, create.88
In this light, Ulster masculinities were not in crisis during the Great War. If any-
thing, they were enjoying their heyday. For those who found the Great War a
time that brought Ulster Catholics and Protestants together through shared
experiences and growing fraternalism, the main legacy of the war was one of
fellowship. For those with overt political and sectarian agendas, the traditional
language of noble sacrifice and duty fulfilled became a core part of their pub-
lic speeches and propaganda campaigns. 
However, shades of gallantry and gentlemanly heroism were not quite 
the themes of Captain William Montgomery’s personal war experiences.
Montgomery, a veteran of Messines Ridge and Passchendaele with the 9th
Royal Irish Rifles, 36th (Ulster) Division, wrote to his parents of his realization
that, as an Ulsterman, violent conflict was his natural province. “War,” he
wrote, 
and the profession — the oldest man’s profession of ARMS is to me the
absolute acme of joy and excitement …. It is a sure thing now that real war
not peace soldiering is my job …. The statistics are hard against me and my
type, but just as soon as it starts bursting near me I go joyous mad and just run
amok. I can’t explain it. It has often puzzled me, but there it is and it is worse
today after 22 months than it was when I started. Which of my ancestors had
it? Some of them must have had it. Pure naked primitive raw red lust to kill
with the naked hand, tear his throat out with long fingernails overlaid with the
trained knowledge that I can do worse sitting in a dugout quite cool and com-
fortable.89
Montgomery was fascinated by the martial identity he discovered within
himself once he was engaged in battle. “The labour, suffering, strain, casualties,
are unceasing” he wrote, “but still the spirit of our manhood triumphs. It does
surely triumph, my parents, and I believe will finally conquer and vanquish. It
must because it has not failed in extremis.”90
Montgomery’s views on manhood and violence further complicate the role
masculinities play within military and cultural history, when war “brought
nationalism’s aggressiveness into sharp focus” and “freed aggression from
88 IWM, PP/MCR/24, R.L. Greenway, memoirs. 
89 PRONI, D/1294/1/1/30, Captain William A. Montgomery, letter to his parents, August 1917.
Capitalization and emphasis as in the original. 
90 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
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restraint as men went over the top.”91 Captain Montgomery’s private experi-
ence of war made him realize important aspects about his own personality, but
his focus was not on the blood-sacrifice of the public sphere, but blood-lust and
the visceral enjoyment he personally derived from killing. These descriptions,
which he intertwined with his belief in the undying nature of manliness on the
battlefield, were hardly in keeping with the loftier sentiments of honour, duty,
and noble sacrifice associated with Unionist society’s incarnation of heroism.
One could argue that Montgomery’s sense of warrior masculinity was an exam-
ple of the essentialist stereotype of the Berserker Celt, the widespread
assumption that violence was ultimately an Irishman’s true nature.92 In An
Intimate History of Killing, Joanna Bourke discusses the myth of the bellicose
Irishman, where popular legend held that the Irish were innately combative and
that “harboured within the breasts of Irishmen was a reservoir of aggression
which needed to be released.”93 Montgomery’s private reflections on his “prim-
itive red raw lust to kill” superficially support this theory of Irish bellicosity. On
further examination, however, his admissions were more complex. While
Montgomery no doubt enjoyed the soldiering life as the “absolute acme of joy
and excitement,” he also coupled his actions on the battlefield with religious
belief and the “spirit of manhood.” This made his blood-lust both a visceral and
an intellectual experience that he himself was able to analyze to a certain
degree. In this respect, Montgomery’s love of warfare was a personal reflection
on his manly nature that stood as more than an essentialist interpretation of the
Irish- or Ulsterman as a cipher for violent behaviour. While flouting
Unionism’s pure vision of an epic hero incurring an imperial blood-debt for the
province in battle, Montgomery’s letters to his parents revealed the complexi-
ties of the warrior image among soldiers in the field and their evaluation of their
own war-time masculinity. 
Montgomery’s belief in his personal capacity for armed conflict also
pointed to the realities of Ulster’s future in the postwar years with the onset of
the Troubles between 1920 and 1922. Many Protestant ex-soldiers joined the
controversial “B” Specials of the Ulster Special Constabulary, while some
Catholic veterans joined the IRA or found themselves hated in their own com-
munities for having fought with the British instead of against them.94 As events
progressed after 1921 under the newly-partitioned state of Northern Ireland,
91 Mosse, The Image of Man, 110. 
92 St. John G. Ervine, Irishmen of Today: Sir Edward Carson and the Ulster Movement (Dublin:
Maunsel and Co., 1915), 59. 
93 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in Twentieth Century
Warfare (London: Granta 1999), 106–7; Michael MacDonough, The Irish at the Front
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1916), 111. 
94 Keith Jeffery, Ireland and the Great War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),
65–6; Denman, Ireland’s Unknown Soldiers, 145. 
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men with allegiances to Protestantism, the Unionist Party, and the 36th (Ulster)
Division soon found themselves in positions of lasting authority and power
over their Catholic-Nationalist neighbours and fellow veterans. 
The public role Ulster Unionist masculinities played during World War I
created a pillar of modern Northern mythology concerning the importance of
imperialism, heroism, and sacrifice in the north, visible in public speeches, edi-
torials, politicized war remembrances, and the loyalist murals of Northern
Ireland. The power of public imagery and legend often overwhelmed actual
lived experiences, an experience Ulster shared with other regions and nations
that had fought in the Great War. However, the romantic language of heroism
and manliness used by politicians and the press in memorializing Ulster’s dead
soldiers and living veterans contained biased interpretations of the war that
enhanced the sectarian nature of manliness in the north of Ireland, particularly
in terms of deciding whose participation in the war mattered the most. Instead
of using the event to bring communities together in mutual suffering, public
discourse on the First World War and the men it had produced divided Ulster’s
population along the familiar Protestant-versus-Catholic binary. The sacrificial
gentleman-hero, the determined deserter in the woods, and the half-crazed war-
rior in the trenches were all valid representations of Ulster masculinities in the
Great War; the difference was that romanticized visions of Ulster’s sanctified
unionist soldiers received more publicity and acclaim in a public arena geared
to celebrate the achievements of the dominant population. In this way, the com-
plex expressions of wartime masculinities were lost to the more simplistic
vision of Unionist Protestant men laying down their lives for Ulster and the
British Empire. 
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